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Introduction
During the information age, the Internet has facilitated dramatic
increases in worldwide interconnectivity and communication. This form
of globalization has yielded benefits, such as improved standards of living
in the developing world, but it has also given rise to new weapons of resistance for groups seeking to oppose certain political measures and ideologies. One demonstration of the latter point came about through the cyber
attacks on Estonia in April and May 2007 by digital activists from the
Russian diaspora. This article examines these fundamentally political
attacks in cyberspace within the overall context of globalization. It argues
that the situation that unfolded in Estonia in the spring of 2007 illustrates
the increasing ability of transnational networks to use digital tools to challenge the policies and sovereignty of nation-states worldwide. However,
the multinational responses to the Estonian cyber terrorist attacks demonstrate the growing interest of states in defending national sovereignty
in the realm of cyberspace.

Ethnic Tensions in Estonia
Estonia and Russia have a long history of strife in their bilateral relationship, and the problems between these ethnic populations date back to
hundreds of years before the existence of modern nation-states. Following
the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States in 1940, and throughout the
Cold War, the Kremlin relocated hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians to Estonia. The purpose behind these mass migrations was two-fold:
to increase cohesion in the Eastern Bloc and to "Russify" Estonian culture. Following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the
U.S.S.R., the government in Tallinn implemented policies designed to
minimize Russian influences on Estonian culture.1, 2 And although Estonia joined NATO in 2004 and received the Atlantic Alliance's Article 5
mutual security guarantee, distrust of Moscow's intentions remains
strong. After several years of lobbying, Estonia recently received NATO
contingency plans to protect the country in the event of a hypothetical
Russian invasion.3 There are also reports that the government has even
created house-to-house defense plans against Russian aggression.4
The cyber attacks on Estonia occurred within the overall climate of
tension between ethnic Estonians and the country's Russian minority
population. On April 30, 2007, the government moved the Bronze
Soldier—a memorial commemorating the Soviet liberation of Estonia
from the Nazis—from Tõnismägi Park in central Tallinn to the Tallinn
Military Cemetery. This decision sparked rioting among the Russian50
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speaking community, which comprised around 26 percent of Estonia's
population in 2007.5 To ethnic Estonians, the Bronze Soldier symbolized
Soviet oppression. But to Russian minorities, its relocation represented
further marginalization of their ethnic identity. As Mary Kaldor and
David Szakonyi argue,6, 7 a perceived attack on the identity of a
subordinate group is likely to provoke a nationalist backlash, as occurred
in Estonia. In addition to rioting and violence from April 27 to May 18,
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) cyber attacks targeting the country's
infrastructure shut down the websites of all government ministries, two
major banks, and several political parties. At one point, hackers even
disabled the parliamentary email server.8 Estonian officials like Foreign
Minister Urmas Paet quickly accused Russia of perpetrating the attacks,
but European Commission and NATO technical experts were unable to
find credible evidence of Kremlin participation in the DDoS strikes.9

Globalization and Electronic Resistance
Increased communication, networking, and reliance on digital
infrastructure in the information age empower transnational resistance
movements and create new vulnerabilities for nation-states. In the global
Russian diaspora community, email and inexpensive international
telephone services "create a shared immediacy and 'virtual'
togetherness."10 When combined with satellite television, the wide
availability of Russian-language publications, and a plethora of Internet
forums, these elements of globalization have enabled the Russian ethnic
identity to transcend geopolitical borders. During the cyber attacks on
Estonia, Russian-language forums provided news updates and a
recruiting ground for interested hackers. This indicates that—in addition
to a shared identity—digital technology enables rapid transnational
mobilization in times of crisis.
Alongside eased mobilization across the global Russian diaspora, Estonia's dependency on information technology (IT) provided angry hackers
with several appealing targets for DDoS attacks. Like most other western
states, Estonia relies on the Internet for its critical infrastructure; electronic networks are integral to the functioning of government operations,
electric power grids,11 banking services, and even Tallinn's water supply.
In Estonia, 97 percent of bank transactions occur online; and in 2007, 60
percent of the country's population used the Internet on a daily basis.12
Further, Mihkel Tammet, the IT director at the Estonian Defense Ministry, explains that the Estonian state is so reliant on the Internet that its
model of government operations is referred to as "paperless government."13 The only Estonian bank to report its operating losses due to the
51
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strikes estimated around $1 million in damages,14 and the attacks prevented credit card and automatic teller machine transactions from occurring for several days.15 Meanwhile, the hackers disabled the
parliamentary email server and the IT capabilities of several government
ministries, paralyzing the state's ability to effectively respond. During the
crisis, former White House cyber-security advisor Howard Schmidt even
went so far as to say, "Estonia has built their future on having a high-tech
government and economy, and they've basically been brought to their
knees because of these attacks."16
This type of transnational digital mobilization to exploit the vulnerabilities of nation-states for political purposes exemplifies the emergent threat
of cyber terrorism. James Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) offers a clear definition of this phenomenon, noting
that cyber terrorism "is the use of computer network tools to shut down
critical national infrastructures (such as energy, transportation, and government operations) or to coerce or intimidate a government or civilian
population."17 In the case of Estonia, the cyber-terrorist attacks occurred
through the use of globally dispersed and virtually unattributable botnets
of "zombie" computers. The hackers hijacked computers—including many
home PCs—in places like Egypt, Russia, and the United States and used
them in a "swarming" DDoS strategy. Government and bank websites that
normally received 1,000 visits a day crashed after receiving upwards of
2,000 hits a second.18 Estonian authorities made a few in-country arrests
but never uncovered the main culprits, who were allegedly operating out
of Russia.
While the cyber-terror attacks on Estonia shocked the international community, by most accounts, they could have been significantly more devastating. In future assaults, hackers may target a state's traffic lights, water
supply, power grids, air traffic controls, or even its military weapon systems. As the Estonian crisis indicates, the Internet has become a powerful
asymmetric tool for transnational groups who view themselves as disenfranchised and seek to intimidate the nation-states and other actors presumably responsible for their grievances. This is an issue of national
sovereignty, as the digital networks and critical infrastructure targeted by
the hackers are the property of—or on the territory of—nation-states.

Interstate or Transnational Threat?
Scholars, practitioners, and students of international security are well
aware of the development of advanced cyber-warfare capabilities by states
around the world like China, Israel, Russia, and the United States. The
52
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rise of these capabilities and their attendant strategies has led many countries to include cyber attacks as an area of concern in their national security doctrines. For instance, Washington lists violence in cyberspace as a
threat alongside traditional terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, and transnational crime in its National Security Strategy.19 Nonetheless, Douglas Thomas of the University of Southern California contends that "99 percent of…hackers do not have the skill or the
ability to organize or execute an attack that would be anything more than
a minor inconvenience."20 Given Russia's advanced cyber-war capabilities and the gravity of the attacks on Estonia, it is a legitimate question to
ask if the attacks were truly executed by autonomous networks of Russian-speaking hackers or if they were committed or sponsored by the
Kremlin.
Even though EU and NATO technical experts were unable to find evidence of Russian involvement in the Estonian cyber-terror incident, it
certainly would have been in Moscow's interests to organize DDoS strikes.
After the movement of the Bronze Soldier and clashes between police and
demonstrators, Russian officials accused Tallinn of human rights violations and demanded that Prime Minister Andrus Ansip apologize and
resign from office.21 While Russia categorically denied any involvement in
the attacks, one unnamed NATO official did not mince words: "I won't
point fingers. But these were not things done by a few individuals. This
clearly bore the hallmarks of something concerted."22 Because of economic interdependence and the threat of nuclear escalation, Russia cannot risk attacks on NATO member states,23 perhaps making
unattributable cyber strikes an attractive alternative. In addition to the
fact that NATO's conventional military forces significantly outnumber
those of the Russian Federation,24 Estonia serves as a key transit country
for Russian oil and natural gas supplies to Central and Western Europe.
And for all the rhetoric about Russia's coercive energy politics, Moscow
exports over 90 percent of its gas and oil to Europe,25 fostering a situation
of mutual economic interdependence. A conventional Russian attack on
Estonia would trigger a NATO Article 5 response and could compromise
the energy wealth that has led to growing Russian influence on the international stage. In a world of deterrence and interdependence, virtually
untraceable digital displays of force could allow states to subvert the constraints of the international system.
While we may never know the true extent of Kremlin involvement in the
cyber attacks on Estonia, it is clear that Russian officials encouraged the
hackers by accusing Tallinn of altering history, perpetrating human rights
violations, and encouraging fascism.26 The Russian authorities also
turned a blind eye as pro-Kremlin activists blockaded the Estonian
53

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4, No. 2

Journal of Strategic Security

embassy in Moscow for several days.27 Although it would have served
Russian national interests to test Moscow's cyber-war capabilities on
Estonia, the general consensus among experts is that sophisticated "hacktivists" in Russia—and possibly throughout the global Russian diaspora—
perpetrated the attacks.28 The alarming reality of the situation is that, in
the information age, computer-savvy individuals can now threaten the
sovereignty and wellbeing of nation-states, oftentimes from the comfort
of their own homes.

Multinational Responses to Cyber Terror
The 2007 cyber terrorism on Estonia was more than just a temporary nuisance; rather, it was a mild version of a new form of digital violence that
could halt public services, commerce, and government operations. Estonian Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo observed that successful cyber
attacks "can effectively be compared to when your ports are shut to the
sea."29 A blockade is a fitting analogy, as future cyber-terrorist attacks
may disrupt a country's water and electricity supplies, telecommunications (severing its connections to the world), and national defenses.
The seriousness of the attacks on Estonia generated a rapid international
response. Estonia had few formal cyber-defense preparations outside of
its framework for countering traditional acts of terrorism,30 and the government Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) required Finnish,
German, Israeli, and Slovenian assistance to restore normal network
operations.31 NATO CERTs provided additional assistance, while the EU's
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) offered
expert technical assessments of the developing situation. Further, a high
level of intelligence sharing took place among western countries during
the crisis. While Russian-speaking hackers employed the Internet as a
weapon and tool of mobilization, Estonia and its allies used digital networks to successfully counter the attacks.
During and after the DDoS strikes, NATO and EU member states began to
debate new directions for cyber security and the appropriate punishments
for states found to have engaged in digital warfare. Sanctions were one
punishment option that received fairly widespread support. Additionally,
one German official even recommended that NATO consider extending its
Article 5 security guarantees to the realm of cyberspace.32 At its Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO adopted a unified Policy on Cyber
Defence and created the Brussels-based Cyber Defence Management
Authority (CDMA) to "centralise cyber defence operational capabilities
across the Alliance."33 And in August 2008, Tallinn became home to the
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NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD CoE), the
Atlantic Alliance's cyber-security headquarters. On the EU front, in
November 2010, the organization released its Internal Security Strategy,
which calls for integrated responses to cyber-security threats and significant expansion of ENISA's duties beyond its previously limited analytical
role.34
Beyond these efforts, throughout 2010 and in the early months of 2011,
both organizations announced a series of concrete long-term plans aimed
at countering cyber attacks. The EU's new Digital Agenda for Europe
revealed plans to establish CERTs for EU institutions, hold multinational
cyber-defense simulations, and create a joint European cyber-crime platform.35 NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept in Lisbon in November
2011, which indicated that the alliance will take steps to develop strong,
integrated Internet defense capabilities.36 To that end, General Stéphane
Abrial, head of NATO's Allied Command Transformation, has confirmed
that the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability Technical Centre
(NCIRC TC) in Mons, Belgium will become operational in 2012.37 These
EU and NATO actions are indicative of the growing recognition of the
severity of today's digital threats. As U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense
William Lynn warned when discussing NATO vulnerabilities in light of
the Estonian case, "The potential exists for capabilities that are much
more destructive…We're largely in the exploitation/denial phase, but history will tell you that somebody will take it to the extreme."38
The multinational responses to the 2007 attacks on Estonia indicated that
countries would not remain detached and complacent as states or nonstate actors threatened the sovereignty of their allies by using the Internet
as a weapon. Still, it is important to note that the international response
to the events in Estonia occurred within the confines of preexisting security communities. Russia tolerated and encouraged the cyber attacks, and
the Kremlin may have even colluded with the hackers responsible for the
strikes. China addressed the matter as an internal Estonian security
dilemma and eschewed involvement in the resultant international cybersecurity discussions. Regardless of any secret complicity or participation
in the Estonian cyber attacks, Moscow and Beijing surely analyzed the situation, assessed Tallinn's vulnerabilities and western responses, and
improved upon their own cyber-warfare capabilities and strategies as a
result.
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Conclusion
The severity of the Estonian cyber attacks served as a wake-up call to the
world, as it became clear that potentially autonomous transnational
networks—like unhappy pro-Kremlin "hacktivists"—could avenge their
grievances by digitally targeting and nearly crippling the critical
infrastructure of technically sophisticated nation-states. In the future, an
enhanced focus on cyber security and new multinational strategies and
institutions will be instrumental in countering electronic threats to the
sovereignty and survival of states. However, the world of information
security is not unlike the traditional global security environment; for each
visible action, there is oftentimes a commensurate reaction. The attacks
on Estonia will likely encourage future groups of transnational imitators,
and the events of spring 2007 have provided states with important
information for the further development and improvement of their own
cyber-warfare capabilities.
The benefits of the information age are numerous, but nascent threats like
transnational cyber terrorism and information warfare exist alongside the
positive aspects of globalization. In this period of IT-driven globalization,
the attacks on Estonia demonstrate that even NATO Article 5 and U.S.
nuclear umbrella guarantees cannot ensure the protection of a nationstate's sovereignty in cyberspace. A new challenge has emerged for free
societies: democracies must find ways to strike a balance between allowing Internet freedom on one hand and maintaining adequate early warning and monitoring systems on the other. These systems, combined with
expanded cyber-security cooperation across borders, will be integral in
detecting suspicious digital activities and countering attempted acts of
cyber warfare and cyber terrorism. Just as the world economy has
adapted to the digital era, the Estonian cyber terrorism case indicates that
the foreign and security policies of nation-states must also do so, as difficult-to-attribute asymmetric threats stemming from the Internet are
likely to harm nation-states in the future.
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